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Costs and Benefits to Taxpayers, Consumers, and Producers from U.S.
Ethanol Policies
Abstract
The U.S. ethanol industry is lobbying hard for an extension of existing ethanol import tariffs and blenders tax
credits before they expire at the end of 2010. The purpose of this study is to examine the likely consequences
on the U.S. ethanol industry, corn producers, taxpayers, fuel blenders, and fuel consumers if current policy is
not extended. Impacts of different ethanol policies in both 2011 and 2014 were estimated.
Estimates were obtained by developing a new stochastic model that calculates market-clearing prices for U.S.
ethanol, Brazilian ethanol, and U.S. corn. The model is stochastic because market-clearing prices are calculated
for 5,000 random draws of corn yields and wholesale gasoline prices.
Key assumptions in this study are that the strong growth in flex-fuel vehicles in Brazil continues; intermediate
ethanol blends with few restrictions are implemented in U.S. markets in 2014; U.S. ethanol production
capacity reaches 15 billion gallons in 2014; and Brazilian ethanol production increases by at least 45% by
2014.
Projected strong demand for ethanol in Brazil combined with a largely saturated U.S. ethanol market means
that elimination of ethanol import tariffs would have almost no impact on U.S. corn and ethanol markets in
2011. Elimination of the tax credit would impact markets modestly, with ethanol production declining by an
average of about 700 million gallons. This reduction in ethanol production would cause corn prices to drop by
an average of 23 cents per bushel. Ethanol prices would drop by 12 cents per gallon. Elimination of the tax
credit would shift the burden of meeting mandates from taxpayers to blenders and consumers. Taxpayers
would save more than $6 billion through elimination of the tax credit, or almost $7.00 per gallon of ethanol
produced in excess of mandated amounts.
The impacts of a change in U.S. ethanol policy in 2014 are larger than 2011 impacts because Brazil has a
chance to respond by ramping up its ability to export in response to trade liberalization. But because of strong
domestic demand growth in Brazil and limits on how fast Brazilian ethanol production can increase, the
impacts of a change in policy are still modest. As long as the mandate is maintained, U.S. ethanol production
drops by no more than 500 million gallons, corn prices drop by no more than 16 cents per bushel, and ethanol
prices drop by no more than 35 cents per gallon. If the impact of intermediate blends is not as strong as
assumed in this study, then there will be less incentive for Brazil to export ethanol and the impacts of tariff
elimination would be even more modest.
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The U.S. ethanol industry is lobbying hard for an extension of existing ethanol import tariffs 
and blenders tax credits before they expire at the end of 2010. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the likely consequences on the U.S. ethanol industry, corn producers, taxpayers, fuel 
blenders, and fuel consumers if current policy is not extended. Impacts of different ethanol 
policies in both 2011 and 2014 were estimated. 
Estimates were obtained by developing a new stochastic model that calculates market-
clearing prices for U.S. ethanol, Brazilian ethanol, and U.S. corn. The model is stochastic 
because market-clearing prices are calculated for 5,000 random draws of corn yields and 
wholesale gasoline prices.  
Key assumptions in this study are that the strong growth in flex-fuel vehicles in Brazil 
continues; intermediate ethanol blends with few restrictions are implemented in U.S. markets in 
2014; U.S. ethanol production capacity reaches 15 billion gallons in 2014; and Brazilian ethanol 
production increases by at least 45% by 2014. 
Projected strong demand for ethanol in Brazil combined with a largely saturated U.S. 
ethanol market means that elimination of ethanol import tariffs would have almost no impact on 
U.S. corn and ethanol markets in 2011. Elimination of the tax credit would impact markets 
modestly, with ethanol production declining by an average of about 700 million gallons. This 
reduction in ethanol production would cause corn prices to drop by an average of 23 cents per 
bushel. Ethanol prices would drop by 12 cents per gallon.  Elimination of the tax credit would 
shift the burden of meeting mandates from taxpayers to blenders and consumers.  Taxpayers 
would save more than $6 billion through elimination of the tax credit, or almost $7.00 per gallon 
of ethanol produced in excess of mandated amounts. 
The impacts of a change in U.S. ethanol policy in 2014 are larger than 2011 impacts because 
Brazil has a chance to respond by ramping up its ability to export in response to trade 
liberalization. But because of strong domestic demand growth in Brazil and limits on how fast 
 iv 
Brazilian ethanol production can increase, the impacts of a change in policy are still modest. As 
long as the mandate is maintained, U.S. ethanol production drops by no more than 500 million 
gallons, corn prices drop by no more than 16 cents per bushel, and ethanol prices drop by no 
more than 35 cents per gallon. If the impact of intermediate blends is not as strong as assumed in 
this study, then there will be less incentive for Brazil to export ethanol and the impacts of tariff 
elimination would be even more modest. 
 






COSTS AND BENEFITS TO TAXPAYERS, CONSUMERS,  
AND PRODUCERS FROM U.S. ETHANOL POLICIES 
Introduction 
Congressman Earl Pomeroy (D-ND) and Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) have 
introduced legislation (H.R. 4940, S. 3231 respectively) to extend the 45 cents per gallon 
(CPG) ethanol blenders tax credit (Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit, or VEETC) 
and the 54 CPG ethanol import tariff for five years. Much has been written about the 
impacts to the U.S. ethanol industry if the tax credit and import tariff are allowed to 
expire. For example, a study conducted for the Renewable Fuels Association reports that 
failure to extend the tax credit and tariff would result in a 38% reduction in U.S. ethanol 
production and 112,000 lost jobs.1 Another group, Growth Energy, claims there would be 
160,000 job losses.2 Supporters of biofuels also point to a recent analysis by the Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri to 
demonstrate the importance of tax credits. 3 The study shows that removal of both the tax 
credit and ethanol import tariffs would result in a drop in U.S. production of corn ethanol 
in 2011 from an average (across all 500 examined scenarios) of 13.24 billion gallons 
(BG) to 11.87 BG (a 10.3% drop). 
In a recent economic analysis of the impacts of ethanol tax credits and the 
Renewable Fuel Standard mandates,4 Babcock made the point that tax credits are not 
needed to meet biofuel consumption mandates. The reason is that in the absence of tax 
                                                 




3 See page 64 of FAPRI-MU Report #01 -10 – 2010, Baseline Briefing Book, 
http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/outreach/publications/2010/FAPRI_MU_Report_01_10.pdf. 
4 Bruce A. Babcock, “Mandates, Tax Credits, and Tariffs: Does the U.S. Biofuels Industry Need Them 
All?” CARD Policy Brief 10-PB 1, March 2010, 
http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/synopsis.aspx?id=1125. 
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credits—which subsidize the purchase of biofuels—U.S. gasoline and diesel producers 
and importers would be obligated to buy enough biofuels to meet the mandates. The main 
reaction by supporters of biofuels to this study was that it missed the point of the tax 
credits. The main purpose of tax credits, they said, is not to meet mandated biofuels 
volumes but rather to push consumption beyond mandated volumes. 
But if the main purpose of the blenders tax credit is to push U.S. consumption 
beyond mandated levels, it is important to know more about the magnitude of the costs 
and benefits associated with the additional consumption. For example, according to the 
FAPRI study, ethanol prices would drop by an average of 19 CPG if both the tax credit 
and import tariff were eliminated. So fuel users would pay less for their fuel. In addition, 
subsidies from the ethanol tax credit would drop by $6.25 billion. Is the additional 1.37 
BG of ethanol consumption worth $6.25 billion in subsidies? 
The purpose of this report is to provide more insight into the economic impacts of 
changing U.S. ethanol policies. Questions that are addressed here include the following: 
What impact do U.S. mandates, tax credits, and import tariffs have on U.S. and Brazilian 
ethanol prices, ethanol quantities, and corn prices? What would happen to the U.S. 
ethanol industry and corn producers if current policy were altered? Can the benefits from 
diversifying our transportation fuels into biofuels be obtained at lower taxpayer cost by 
changing the mix of policy instruments? What are the costs and benefits of encouraging 
expansion of sugarcane ethanol in Brazil to meet our energy diversification needs?   
To provide insight into these questions, we examined the future markets for corn and 
ethanol in 2011 and 2014 under alternative policy scenarios. The policy scenarios 
involved different configurations of tax credits, import tariffs, and mandates. All policy 
changes were assumed to occur at the end of calendar year 2010. Consideration of 2014 
in the analysis allows for adjustment in U.S. corn and ethanol production in response to 
growth in the U.S. consumption mandates and adjustment in Brazilian ethanol production 
and export infrastructure to take place in response to a change in U.S. ethanol policy.  
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Overview of the Modeling Approach 
A partial equilibrium stochastic model was used to conduct this analysis as a 
practical way to estimate the changes in prices and quantities that would occur under 
different ethanol policies. The model that was constructed for this analysis is based on 
fundamental supply and demand concepts and is calibrated to reflect reasonable 
assumptions about what future market conditions will be. The three markets included in 
the model are the U.S. markets for corn and ethanol and the Brazilian market for ethanol. 
While many factors influence the U.S. markets, three are key. Given U.S. corn acreage, 
corn yields will determine the profitability of producing corn ethanol relative to 
sugarcane ethanol. Gasoline prices will determine the overall market demand for ethanol 
because ethanol serves as a substitute for gasoline. And whether the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) approves increases in the ethanol-to-gasoline blend rate above 
10% will determine whether the U.S. market can absorb enough ethanol in 2014 to meet 
mandated consumption levels.   
Uncertainty about corn yields and gasoline prices is accounted for by making the 
model stochastic. What this means is that market outcomes (corn and ethanol prices and 
quantities) are calculated for many different combinations of corn yields and gasoline 
prices. The combinations are random draws (as in a card draw). The average of the yield 
draws for the 2010 crop equals USDA’s current projected yield of 163.5 bu/ac that was 
published in the May WASDE report.5 This yield is higher than the 2010 trend yield 
because the crop was planted in such a timely manner. The average draw for the 2013 
crop is the trend yield for the 2013 crop year, which equals 163.8 bu/ac.6 The average 
gasoline price draw for both 2011 and 2014 equals the early May average price for 
gasoline futures for 2011, which is $2.30 per gallon.7 The variability of the yield draws is 
                                                 
5 See the May 11, 2010, version of “World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates” published by the 
World Agricultural Outlook Board of USDA. The latest version of this report is available at 
http://www.usda.gov/oce/commodity/wasde/latest.pdf.   
6 The 2010 mean crop yield is almost equal to the 2013 trend yield because USDA adjusted the 2010 corn 
yield for the nearly perfect 2010 planting season. 
7 Gasoline futures dropped dramatically after this analysis was completed. For those readers interested in 
knowing how this study’s results would change for lower or higher gasoline prices, all the model runs for a 
wide range of corn yields and gasoline prices are accessible as a downloadable appendix to this report 
(Supplemental Appendix to 10-SR 106). 
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based on historical data. Gasoline price volatility is obtained from option premiums for 
gasoline futures. For each combination of the random draws, the computer solves for the 
prices of U.S. corn and ethanol and Brazilian ethanol such that demand equals supply. 
The markets are simulated 5,000 times. For each outcome, market-clearing prices and 
quantities are recorded. The process is repeated for each alternative policy scenario. The 
average of the 5,000 prices and quantities under each policy scenario are used to calculate 
the impacts of adopting each alternative policy.  
A key modeling assumption for 2014 is that EPA will increase the allowable ethanol-
to-gasoline blend rate above E10 (10% ethanol blend). There are two justifications for 
this assumption. First, existing biofuels mandates will not be met if E10 and E85 are the 
only allowable blend rates. Second, EPA signaled that it intended to eventually allow E15 
blends on newer vehicles when it announced that it was delaying a decision on a request 
by the ethanol industry to allow higher blends.8 The impact of allowing higher blend rates 
would be a significantly higher market demand for ethanol at high volumes (greater than 
13 BG). The analysis assumes that increased market demand with intermediate blends 
occurs in 2014 but not in 2011. In 2011, blenders’ willingness to pay for ethanol above 
13 BG is heavily discounted to reflect the E10 blend wall.  
The U.S. Market for Ethanol 
Ethanol is a commodity that is sold by ethanol producers and purchased by fuel 
blenders. As with all traded commodities, the price of ethanol is largely determined 
by market supply and demand relationships. In addition to market forces, government 
policies can influence both the supply of ethanol as well as the demand for ethanol. 
Before exploring how government intervention affects supply and demand, it is 
important to understand current supply and demand relationships. 
The Demand for Ethanol. The demand for ethanol reflects the value that blenders 
place on different volumes of ethanol. This value depends on both market factors and 
government policies. The two most important market factors are ethanol’s value as an 
octane enhancer and ethanol’s value as a substitute for gasoline. Because ethanol has a 
                                                 
8 See EPA Administrator Jackson’s testimony on March 3, 2010, reported by Reuters at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN039221620100303. 
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high octane content, 87 octane fuel can be created by blending 90% 84 octane gasoline 
with 10% ethanol. Any cost savings that accrue to refineries from being able to produce 
84 octane gasoline rather than 87 octane gasoline because of ethanol increases the value 
of ethanol. On a volume basis, a gallon of ethanol also replaces a gallon of gasoline. 
But ethanol has a lower energy content than gasoline, so fuel mileage of automobiles 
running on E10 is approximately 3% lower than that of automobiles running on pure 
gasoline. If blenders only valued ethanol as a substitute for gasoline, and if consumers’ 
willingness to pay for blended gasoline reflected this lower energy content, then the 
value of a gallon of ethanol would equal about two-thirds the value of gasoline.9 Thus, 
from a product blending point of view, the value that is placed on ethanol can run from 
a low of two-thirds of the price of gasoline to some value above the price of gasoline 
depending on the value that is placed on ethanol because of refinery cost reductions. 
But the blending value is not the only factor that determines the market value of 
ethanol. The market demand curve for ethanol reflects the net value of an additional 
gallon of ethanol above a given volume. If additional ethanol can only be blended if new 
transportation or blending facilities are constructed, then the marginal value of ethanol 
will be much lower than the blending value of ethanol that one would calculate based on 
gasoline prices and cost savings to refineries. This explains why the price of ethanol can 
fall far below the price of gasoline. Low prices, in turn, give an incentive for blenders to 
invest in the facilities that allow them to blend all motor fuel with ethanol in the United 
States. Without an EPA decision to allow higher ethanol blend ratios, once all motor fuel 
is blended into E10, then increased ethanol consumption can only come about through 
increased consumption of E85 or through exports.  
In this analysis for 2011, the marginal market value of ethanol at 15 BG is fixed at 
50% of the price of gasoline, which reflects the low price of ethanol that is needed to 
induce consumption of E85. At 5 BG, the marginal market value of ethanol is fixed at the 
price of gasoline. For volumes between 5 and 15 BG, the marginal value is a linear 
interpolation between these points.  
                                                 
9 All analysis in this report uses wholesale gasoline and ethanol prices. Because consumers pay retail prices 
that reflect taxes and mark-ups, this two-thirds rule at the wholesale level overstates the retail market value 
of ethanol. 
6 / Babcock, Barr, and Carriquiry   
 
In 2014, the introduction of intermediate ethanol blends, such as E15 or E20, is 
assumed to increase the marginal market value of ethanol for high volumes. To capture 
this increase, the marginal value is set equal to 75% of the price of gasoline at 15 BG.10 
The key assumption here is not EPA approval, but rather, that EPA approves 
implementation of intermediate blends in a manner that increases the market demand 
for ethanol enough to sell 15 BG at 75% of the price of gasoline. 
The Supply of Ethanol. The supply of ethanol in the United States equals domestic 
production plus imports minus exports. Because the United States is usually a net 
importer of ethanol,11 all the analysis here assumes that net imports are positive and that 
imports come from Brazil. According to statistics on the website of the Renewable Fuels 
Association, in 2011 the United States will have the potential to produce about 14.5 BG 
of ethanol if all plants currently under construction are built out. The proportion of this 
capacity that will be operating depends on whether processing margins (revenue minus 
costs) are positive. If margins are positive, then profits will be maximized by running 
plants at full capacity. Tight margins will lower production. The margin equation is given 
in the appendix. 
The primary determinant of processing margins is the availability of corn for ethanol 
production—relative to ethanol production capacity—after feed demand, food demand, 
seed demand, export demand, and the demand for carryover stocks have been met. Of 
course the amount of non-ethanol demand depends on the price of corn. Higher corn prices 
lower non-ethanol demand and free up more corn for ethanol. Figure 1 shows the 2011 
demand curves for non-ethanol corn used in this study. These demand curves are calibrated  
                                                 
10 The ad hoc nature of this market demand specification is largely unavoidable because of the uncertainties 
involved in determining the marginal value of ethanol. Since 2008, the U.S. price of ethanol has ranged 
from 75 CPG over to 90 CPG under the price of gasoline. This large spread shows how sensitive the 
marginal value is to the volume of ethanol produced at any given time. The spread also makes it difficult to 
project future marginal values without detailed knowledge of market penetration rates across the United 
States as well as knowledge of how quickly intermediate blends will begin to affect the market. Because 
this analysis is concerned primarily with determining the impact of alternative ethanol policies and because 
this market demand specification is common to all scenarios, the results of the analysis are not overly 
sensitive to changes in the specification of market demand. If this market demand specification understates 
the future value of ethanol, then the primary impact will be to understate the profitability of owning a U.S. 
ethanol plant. 
11 The United States in 2010 may be a net exporter of ethanol. If this occurs it will be partly due to existing 
import tariffs combined with low domestic U.S. prices and tight Brazilian supplies. 
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Source: See the appendix for all equations. 
FIGURE 1. Non-ethanol U.S. corn demand in 2011 
 
to the May 11 WASDE projections. The equations and data sources for all non-ethanol 
demands are given in the appendix. The Figure 1 demand curves show the quantities of 
corn demanded for different corn prices. 
The supply of corn to produce ethanol in 2011 equals beginning corn stocks plus 
2010 production. The difference between the 2010/11 marketing year for corn and the  
2011 calendar year is not accounted for. The 2010 production equals harvested acres 
(assumed known) and the corn yield per harvested acre, which is unknown. The supply of 
corn available for ethanol equals total corn supply minus total non-ethanol demand. This 
means that bumper crops will increase the supply of ethanol whereas short crops will 
decrease the supply.  
The demand for ethanol imports can be found by subtracting U.S. ethanol demand 
from U.S. ethanol supply. The supply of and demand for ethanol is shown in Figure 2 for 
a gasoline price of $2.30 per gallon and a corn yield of 163.5 bu/ac. Domestic production 
of ethanol cannot exceed 14.5 BG because of the capacity constraint. With this gasoline  
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FIGURE 2. U.S. supply of and demand for ethanol in 2011 with no government 
programs 
 
price and corn yield, import demand is zero unless the price of imports is less than $1.60 
per gallon. The U.S. could export ethanol for prices greater than $1.60 per gallon if the 
price premium were great enough to cover the cost of transporting ethanol to Brazil. In 
the absence of any government program and no imports from Brazil, the model used in 
this study predicts that the U.S. ethanol price would be $1.60 per gallon and the quantity  
produced would be about 11 BG in 2011 with a gasoline price of $2.30 per gallon and a 
corn yield of 163.5 bu/ac. 
The model’s prediction of 11 BG of production in 2011 with no government 
mandates or subsidies may strike some as a fanciful projection because it assumes that 
oil companies and blenders find it in their own interest to blend 11 BG of ethanol when 
the price of ethanol is 70% of the price of gasoline. The only reason blenders would use 
this much ethanol at this price is that infrastructure investments that have been made 
allow a large quantity of ethanol to move from the Midwest where the ethanol is 
produced to where most of the nation’s fuel is used on the coasts. It is doubtful whether 
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these investments would have been made were it not for the added incentives of tax 
credits, mandates, and clean air standards that have occurred in the past. However, the 
purpose of this study is to estimate the impacts if ethanol policy is changed at the end 
of 2010. All investments made prior to this point in time are fixed, and companies will 
operate to maximize their returns. 
The 2014 supply of corn (and hence ethanol) will depend on what prices U.S. farmers 
expect to receive in 2014 plus beginning stocks. If the United States adopts a policy that 
induces more ethanol imports from Brazil, then corn prices will be lower than if current 
policy is maintained. However, this study does not employ a full dynamic model of U.S. 
agriculture so it does not try to predict what corn acreage will be in 2014. Instead, 2014 corn 
acreage is fixed at the level that generates the same average corn price that the model predicts 
for 2011 under the assumption that current ethanol policy remains unchanged. This fixing of 
corn acreage overstates average corn production and underestimates what corn prices would 
be for alternative policies that lower the demand for U.S. ethanol in 2014.  
Export Supply from Brazil 
Just as the supply of corn to produce U.S. ethanol depends on the production of 
corn and non-ethanol corn demand, the supply of ethanol imports from Brazil depends 
on Brazilian ethanol production and the Brazilian domestic demand for ethanol. The 
Brazilian demand for ethanol has been growing rapidly because the number of flex-fuel 
vehicles (FFVs) has grown dramatically in recent years. Since 2003 more than 10 
million vehicles (42% of the Brazilian light vehicle fleet) have been purchased. The 
number of FFVs is projected to grow to 12.5 million in 2011.12 The proportion of FFV 
owners that will run their vehicles on ethanol rather than gasoline depends on the price 
of ethanol relative to the price of gasoline.13 If the price of ethanol is too high, then 
consumers will switch to gasoline. For example, from November 2009 to March 2010, 
the price of ethanol relative to gasoline in Brazil rose from 0.56 to 0.73. The proportion 
                                                 
12 Projections of the size of the Brazilian FFV fleet were provided to the authors by UNICA. For these 
projections, an income demand elasticity for cars of 1.5 was used, based on estimations for the 1990s 
placing that elasticity in the 1.1–1.5 range. The source of these estimates is J.A. De Negri, “Elasticidade-
Renda e Elasticidade-Preco da Demanda de Automoveis no Brasil,” Texto para Discussao No. 558, 
Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada, Brasil.  
13 Gasoline in Brazil contains 25% ethanol.  
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of FFV owners who used ethanol dropped from 70% to 44%. The sharp increase in the 
price of ethanol during this time period reflected the poor sugarcane harvest. This 
shows that consumption of ethanol in Brazil responds readily to changes in ethanol 
prices in that range of relative prices. To capture the effects of a change in relative 
prices on the demand for ethanol, we modeled the proportion of Brazilian FFVs using 
ethanol as a function of the retail price of ethanol relative to the price of gasoline. 
Details of the demand curve are provided in the appendix.  
Many Brazilian ethanol plants have some limited flexibility in choosing how much 
ethanol to produce relative to sugar production. If sugar prices rise relative to ethanol 
prices, the plants will produce more sugar. This means that even if sugarcane crush is 
fixed (as it largely is for 2011), the amount of Brazilian ethanol that will be produced 
depends on the price of ethanol given a price of sugar. The details for how the Brazilian 
ethanol supply curve was specified are also provided in the appendix. 
Calculating export supply then is simply a matter of subtracting Brazilian ethanol 
demand from Brazilian ethanol supply, all of which are shown in Figure 3. If the import 
demand curve from the United States intersects the export supply curve from Brazil, then 
exports will take place. Note that the export supply curve in Brazil (Figure 3) starts at 
about $1.70 per gallon of ethanol whereas the demand for imports into the United States 
(Figure 2) starts at $1.60 per gallon. This means that at the average U.S. conditions 
assumed in Figure 2, there would be no U.S. imports of Brazilian ethanol.14 If one were 
to use historical prices rather than current market conditions to estimate export demand 
curves, one would find that Brazil would be a much more competitive exporter. But a 
relatively weak U.S. dollar combined with strong domestic demand growth in Brazil has 
changed this relationship. Ethanol imports would begin to come into the United States if 
2011 corn yields were low enough or gasoline prices were high enough to increase the 
U.S. demand for imported ethanol enough to overcome shipping costs and to pull enough 
ethanol away from Brazilian consumers. When trade occurs in the model simulations, 
Brazilian domestic prices of ethanol rise and U.S. domestic ethanol prices fall, thus  
                                                 
14 All analysis in this report is concerned with production and trade of fuel ethanol. All other ethanol 
production and trade is not considered. 
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FIGURE 3. Projected supply, demand, and export supply of Brazilian hydrous 
ethanol in 2011 
 
lowering the difference between U.S. and Brazilian ethanol prices. This illustrates the 
importance of calculating U.S. import demand for many different combinations of yields 
and gasoline prices. Furthermore, we know that government intervention in ethanol 
markets is important. How this intervention affects market outcomes is discussed next. 
Effect of Government Intervention 
The two primary means by which government policy affects the demand for ethanol 
is through the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2) and the blenders tax credit. RFS2 places 
a floor under the demand for ethanol. In 2011, the floor is 12.6 BG. The floor rises to 
14.4 BG in 2014. Demand for ethanol can exceed this floor if the economics of blending 
ethanol are favorable, but demand cannot fall below the floor.15 Mandated floor volumes 
of ethanol are enforced by requiring obligated parties (gasoline producers and importers) 
                                                 
15 Ethanol consumption can, in fact, fall below mandates if obligated parties choose to borrow against their 
future obligations to blend ethanol. The borrowing and blending provisions of the implementation rules of 
the RFS2 are not considered in this analysis. 
12 / Babcock, Barr, and Carriquiry   
 
to collect and turn into EPA a specified number of RINs (renewable identification 
numbers). Each unit of ethanol produced has a RIN associated with it. If not enough 
RINs are being generated by ethanol production to meet the demand for RINS by 
obligated parties, then the price of RINs will increase as obligated parties seek to 
purchase RINs in the RIN marketplace. This increase in the price of RINs will be 
reflected in an increase in the price received for ethanol at the plant. This increased price, 
in turn, will induce more ethanol production. This process will continue until enough 
ethanol is produced (with associated RINs) to meet mandated levels. Thus, if market 
demand alone is insufficient to induce enough ethanol production, then the price of RINs 
will increase ethanol supply to mandated levels. If market demand alone leads to 
sufficient volume, then there will be surplus RINs and the market price for RINs will fall 
close to zero.16   
The blenders tax credit directly increases the marginal market value of ethanol by the 
amount of the tax credit. The increase in marginal value of ethanol from the tax credit 
might increase ethanol production above mandated levels. Or the tax credit may have no 
effect at all. To see why, consider the following 2011 scenario. Suppose that a return to 
slow economic growth decreases world demand for crude oil so wholesale gasoline prices 
drop to $1.50 per gallon. Corn production in 2010 is limited because of hot July weather, 
so corn prices increase to $4.00 per bushel. The marginal market value of ethanol at the 
mandated volume is $1.05 per gallon. Add in the 45 CPG tax credit and the marginal 
value of ethanol to blenders is $1.50 per gallon. Corn at $4.00 and ethanol at $1.50 equate 
to such negative margins that many ethanol plants would choose to shut down rather than 
to operate at a loss. But the mandate will not be met if too many ethanol plants shut 
down. Thus, the RIN price would have to increase enough to keep sufficient plants in 
operation. In this situation, the tax credit has no impact on ethanol production levels, corn 
prices, or the price of ethanol. All three are determined by the mandate. In other words, 
when the fundamental economics of ethanol blending are so poor that the blenders tax 
                                                 
16 RIN prices will likely never fall to zero because of the need of blenders who do not blend their required 
amounts to buy RINs from blenders who blend more than required. The price of a traded RIN must at least 
cover transaction costs of the trade. 
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credit does not push ethanol demand past mandated levels, then the tax credit has no 
effect on the ethanol market.  
Now consider the situation if a better corn harvest pushes corn prices down to $3.20 
per bushel. With the tax credit in place, ethanol processing margins are in positive 
territory at mandated volumes. These positive processing margins will push ethanol 
production beyond the 12.6 BG mandate. All ethanol in excess of the mandate can be 
attributed to the tax credit because without the tax credit, processing margins at 12.6 BG 
would be negative, which would necessitate using higher RIN prices to induce production 
of the mandate.  
The previous two examples illustrate the importance of considering many different 
combinations of corn yields and gasoline prices when estimating the impacts of policy 
changes. The first example combination leads to the conclusion that elimination of the tax 
credit would have no market impact in 2011. But the tax credit would increase ethanol 
production under the second combination. Because nobody can know with certainty what 
the future holds for corn yields and gasoline prices, it is impossible to know for certain 
what the impacts of an ethanol policy change will be. The best that can be done today to 
predict the future impact of a policy change is to estimate the impacts under a range of 
corn yields and gasoline prices and to report the results. 
The third important instrument of government policy is the ethanol import tariff. 
Importers of ethanol must pay a fixed import tax of 54 CPG plus an ad valorem tax of 
2.5%. The effect of the import tariff is to shift up the export supply of Brazilian ethanol 
by an amount equal to the import tariff. This means that Brazil will not export any 
ethanol to the United States unless U.S. ethanol prices increase enough to cover both the 
import tariff and transportation costs. If the wholesale U.S. price of ethanol rises to $2.00 
per gallon, the total import tariff is about 60 CPG. After adding in 16 CPG transportation 
costs, this means that Brazilians will not be willing to export ethanol to the United States 
unless their wholesale ethanol price delivered to a port in Brazil falls below $1.24 per 
gallon, or 0.57 reals per liter.  
Up to 7% of the previous year’s U.S. domestic consumption of ethanol can be 
imported tariff free from Caribbean countries under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). 
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However, these countries do not produce ethanol. Rather, they can import hydrous 
ethanol from Brazil, take out the water, and then export anhydrous ethanol to the United 
States. The cost of dehydrating the ethanol plus the extra shipping and handling it costs to 
unload and load the ethanol (approximately 30 CPG) acts just like a tariff in that it raises 
the cost of importing ethanol into the United States. This analysis accounts for CBI 
imports by imposing a tariff of 30 CPG on the first 700 million gallons (MG) of imports. 
For ethanol imports in excess of 700 MG, the import tariff is set at 54 CPG plus 2.5%.  
Figure 4 shows the effect of the blenders tax credit on import demand and the effect 
of the import tariff on export supply. All quantities are anhydrous ethanol. The U.S. 
import demand assumes a gasoline price of $2.30 per gallon and a corn yield of 163.5 
bu/ac. The quantity of exports that would be shipped to the United States from Brazil is 
given by the intersection of the export supply curve and the import demand curve. With 
no tax credit or import tariff and no trade, Brazilian ethanol prices are actually higher  
 
 
FIGURE 4. Impact of blenders tax credit and tariff on Brazilian exports to the 
United States 
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than the U.S. ethanol price. This is shown by the U.S. export demand curve intersecting 
the Brazilian export supply curve (Point A) at a negative quantity. Negative imports 
imply positive exports, so, if anything, at average market conditions, the United States 
would export ethanol to Brazil or to other countries with no government intervention in 
2011. In reality, consideration of transportation costs would likely eliminate most of the 
incentive to export ethanol to Brazil.  
The tax credit increases the demand for imports, which is shown by the shift to the 
dashed green line in Figure 4. The market-clearing level of imports is found at the new 
intersection at point B. With the tax credit and no import tariff, the market-clearing 
volume of imports of Brazilian ethanol is just about zero. That is, at the projected average 
market conditions in 2011, there is no incentive for Brazil to export ethanol to the United 
States even with no import tariff. This result is due to projected tight ethanol supplies 
(relative to domestic demand) in Brazil. The import tariff makes exports to the United 
States even less profitable, as can be seen by the shift up to the dashed purple line in 
Figure 4. What Figure 4 shows is that if the import tariff were removed, there would be 
some combinations of corn yields and gasoline prices that would create an incentive for 
Brazil to export ethanol to the United States, but the volume of exports would be small. 
With the tariff in place, there are few combinations that makes exports profitable.   
More generally, Figure 4 illustrates that the tax credit stimulates the demand for 
imports whereas the import tariff counteracts this stimulus by increasing the cost of 
importing ethanol. As shown in Figure 4, the net effect of the two policies is to reduce the 
incentive to import ethanol from Brazil relative to a situation with no tax credit and no 
blenders credit. The reason for this negative net effect is that the import tariff is larger 
than the blenders tax credit and that part of the stimulating effect on import demand from 
the blenders tax credit is reduced because of an increase in domestic supply. This means 
that if one wanted to exactly counteract the stimulating effects of the 45 CPG tax on 
Brazilian exports, then a tariff smaller than 45 CPG would be needed. 
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Policy Alternatives and Results 
We are now in a position to estimate the effects of alternative policy scenarios. The 
scenarios considered are as follows: 
1. Continue the tariff and VEETC as is.  
2. Eliminate the tariff but renew VEETC.  
3. Eliminate VEETC, but renew the tariff.  
4. Eliminate both the tariff and VEETC.  
5. Bring the tariff and VEETC into parity.  
6. Eliminate all programs. 
Results for 2011 
Table 1 presents the average market-clearing prices and quantities of key variables 
for each policy scenario for 2011. Reported are averages across 5,000 draws for U.S. corn 
yields and gasoline prices. The model solutions for each combination of corn yield and 
gasoline price are available for download. Thus, interested readers can recreate the full 
distribution of results. The Supplemental Appendix to Staff Report 10-SR 106 is posted 
at http://www.card.iastate.edu/ publications/synopsis.aspx?id=1135, or contact the 
corresponding author.   
Maintenance of Current Policies. The first row of results reports the average 
projected conditions for 2011 if current policy concerning the mandate for conventional  
 
TABLE 1. Average results for ethanol policy scenarios in 2011  






















Mandate, Tax Credit, Tariff 3.79 1.83 1.76 0.07 13.51 13 
Mandate, Tax Credit 3.78 1.82 1.80 0.07 13.48 83 
Mandate, Tariff 3.56 1.71 1.76 0.32 12.83 0 
Mandate Only 3.55 1.71 1.78 0.32 12.80 37 
Mandate, Tax Credit = Tariff 3.79 1.83 1.77 0.07 13.51 13 
No Programs 2.98 1.55 1.76 0.0 11.08 11 
aAverage U.S. wholesale price. Includes any RIN price. 
bWholesale domestic Brazilian ethanol price for anhydrous ethanol. The exchange rate  is set at 1.75 reals per dollar. 
cBillion gallons. 
dMillion gallons. 
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biofuels, VEETC, and import tariffs is extended.17 The average U.S. ethanol price is 
$1.83 per gallon. If one subtracts the 45 CPG tax credit, then the average marginal 
market value of ethanol is $1.40 per gallon, which makes the market value of ethanol at 
the wholesale level equal to 61% of the wholesale price of gasoline. The Brazilian 
average ethanol price of $1.76 per gallon is the wholesale price of anhydrous ethanol. 
This large price difference between Brazil and the United States can persist because 
under current policy it is quite difficult to find a combination of corn yield and gasoline 
price that can generate enough demand for imported Brazilian ethanol to offset 
transportation costs and tariffs. Thus, the Brazilian market is practically isolated from 
the U.S. market under current policy as is evident by the average U.S. import volume of 
only two million gallons. 
Average U.S. ethanol production is 13.51 BG. For 32% of the 5,000 draws, 
production is equal to the 12.6 BG mandate. When production equals the mandate, the 
RIN price is positive. Thus when the RIN price is positive, the average RIN price is 22 
CPG. For the other 68% of the draws the mandate is not binding so the RIN price is 
zero. This makes the overall average RIN price equal to 7 CPG. In 28% of the draws, 
production equals capacity of 14.5 BG. As long as production margins are positive, the 
model assumes that ethanol production will expand until capacity is reached. For 40% 
of the draws, production is between capacity and the mandate. Average processing 
margins (not reported in Table 1) for ethanol producers are 18 cents per bushel.18 
Elimination of the Tariff. Elimination of the import tariff has almost no effect on corn 
or ethanol markets. The average price of corn and ethanol drop by only one cent. The 
reason for such a small change is that Brazilian demand for ethanol in 2011 relative to 
production is so large. Sales of FFVs in Brazil in 2009 were 2.65 million. Brazil’s vehicle 
fleet now contains more than 10 million FFVs. The model uses a projection of 12.5 
million FFVs in 2011 and 1 million ethanol-only vehicles. If all 13.5 million of these 
vehicles use ethanol in 2011 and if each vehicle uses 2,175 liters of ethanol per year, then 
                                                 
17 The impacts of California’s low carbon fuel standard and the mandates for advanced biofuels are not 
considered in either 2011 or 2014 in this analysis because of the uncertainty about how they will be 
implemented and the resulting impact on the import demand for Brazilian sugarcane ethanol.  
18 All U.S. reported average ethanol processing margins are in excess of the 20 CPG that is assumed to be 
needed to keep an ethanol plant running. 
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the potential 2011 demand for hydrous ethanol in Brazil is 29.3 billion liters.19 In 
addition, there are a projected 17.8 million gasoline cars in Brazil. With gasoline 
comprised of 25% anhydrous ethanol, this constitutes another 7 billion liters of ethanol 
for a potential fuel demand of 36.3 billion liters. Add in a projected non-fuel industrial 
demand of 1.3 billion liters and non-U.S. exports of 1.8 billion liters and the potential 
demand for ethanol adds up to almost 40 billion liters. This large demand relative to 
forecasted production of 34 billion liters means that a significant portion of Brazilian 
FFV drivers must be induced to use gasoline. The only inducement is a high price of 
ethanol relative to gasoline. Thus, the domestic price of ethanol must be high enough in 
Brazil for demand to fall enough to meet supply. This is why the average price of 
Brazilian ethanol is so close to the U.S. price even with the tariff in place. Removal of the 
tariff has such a small impact because the only way for Brazil to increase exports in 2011 
is to reduce ethanol consumption. Ethanol production is largely fixed, although the model 
does allow limited increases by cutting sugar production. So the only way to cut ethanol 
consumption is to increase the Brazilian domestic ethanol price. When this occurs and 
exports begin to flow, the price in Brazil becomes even closer to the U.S. ethanol price 
and the incentive to export more lessens. There is no incentive when the prices are equal 
(adjusted for transportation costs). Because the two market prices are so close when the 
tariff is in place (see Figure 4), there really is not much room for expanded exports before 
the prices are equalized. Thus, average exports with the tariff removed total only 83 MG 
in 2011. This small average volume of Brazilian exports is enough to raise the average 
Brazilian ethanol price by about 4 U.S. CPG. Average processing margins for U.S. 
ethanol producers fall by two cents per bushel. 
Elimination of the Blenders Tax Credit. The third scenario examined, removal of the 
tax credit while maintaining the mandate and import tariff, has a larger impact than 
removing the tariff because the tax credit no longer enhances the economics of blending 
above mandated levels. The U.S. ethanol price drops by an average of 12 CPG, which 
                                                 
19 Brazil’s National Agency for Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Biofuels reports that Brazilian hydrous ethanol 
consumption in 2008 totaled 13.3 billion liters. With 1.61 million ethanol vehicles and 7.1 million FFVs, 
and 70% of the FFVs using ethanol, this implies that each vehicle used an average of 2,021 liters per year. 
We assumed that fuel use per vehicle would increase by approximately 7% above this level for both 2011 
and 2014 because of per-capita income growth. 
Costs and Benefits to Taxpayers, Consumers, and Producers from U.S. Ethanol Policies / 19 
 
decreases ethanol production. Elimination of the tax credit would make the mandate 
binding in about 80% of the yield and gasoline draws. This means that the RIN price is 
positive in about 80% of the draws. Hence the average RIN price increases to 32 CPG. 
The RIN price does not increase by the full 45 CPG tax credit because the mandate is not 
always binding without the tax credit. When the mandate does not bind, the RIN price is 
zero. The drop in the U.S. ethanol price decreases the incentive for Brazil to export to the 
United States. The price of corn drops by an average of 23 cents per bushel (5.6%) 
because of the decreased demand for corn by the ethanol industry. Ethanol production 
drops by an average of about 700 MG. Average U.S. ethanol processing margins fall to 
two cents per bushel. 
Mandate Only. Elimination of both the tax credit and the tariff generates market 
conditions that are almost identical to those that would exist if only the tax credit were 
eliminated. The reason for this is that there is little incentive for Brazil to export ethanol 
to the United States given the U.S. production capacity relative to mandated consumption 
levels, and given Brazil’s strong domestic demand. A strong incentive for trade only 
exists when 2011 U.S. corn yields are low and U.S. ethanol producers have a difficult 
time meeting the 2011 mandate. This occurs infrequently enough that average ethanol 
imports under the policy alternative are only 37 MG. Again, average processing margins 
of U.S. ethanol processors fall to two cents per bushel. 
Parity Between Tariff and Tax Credit. As discussed previously in reference to Figure 
4, a 10 cent increase in the blenders tax credit creates a smaller incentive to import 
ethanol than the disincentive caused by a 10 cent increase in the import tariff. This means 
that even if the import tariff were brought into parity with the blenders tax credit of 45 
CPG, then there would still be a net disincentive to import ethanol. Thus a reduction in 
the U.S. import tariff to 45 CPG has practically no market impact because there is still no 
incentive to import Brazilian ethanol. In addition, whatever imports do come into the 
U.S. market flow through the CBI channel because the 30 CPG cost of importing ethanol 
through the CBI is still less than a 45 CPG tariff. Average U.S. processing margins are 18 
cents per bushel. 
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No Government Intervention. To be complete, the impacts of a surprise elimination 
of the mandates, tax credits, and import tariffs are calculated. The price of corn would fall 
by an average of 81 cents per bushel (21%). The reason for this large drop is that farmers 
made their 2010 acreage decisions based on strong ethanol demand. But even with lower 
corn prices enhancing the margins of ethanol plants, U.S. ethanol production drops by an 
average of 2.4 BG to 11.1 BG. Ethanol prices drop by 28 CPG even with this drop in 
ethanol production. The reason for this price drop is that the loss of the tax credit and the 
mandate reduces blenders’ willingness to pay for ethanol by a greater amount than the 
additional ethanol demand stimulated by lower ethanol prices. U.S. ethanol processing 
margins fall to two cents per bushel. 
Summary of 2011 Impacts of Alternative Ethanol Policies. Projected strong demand 
for ethanol in Brazil combined with a largely saturated U.S. ethanol market means that 
elimination of ethanol import tariffs would have almost no impact on U.S. corn and 
ethanol markets in 2011. Elimination of the tax credit would impact the markets more, 
with ethanol production declining by an average of about 700 MG. This reduction in 
ethanol production would cause corn prices to drop by an average of 23 cents per bushel. 
Ethanol prices would drop by 12 CPG. Eliminating the tariff as well as the blenders tax 
credit would impact markets about the same as eliminating the tax credit only. These 
results suggest that the import tariff offers almost no enhancement to U.S. ethanol or corn 
producers in 2011. The tax credit does incentivize production in excess of the mandate in 
2011, so its elimination would impact both markets. The effects are rather modest and are 
in line with those predicted elsewhere (e.g., the FAPRI study).  
Results for 2014 
Projecting the 2014 impacts of changing ethanol policies on January 1, 2011, is more 
difficult because Brazilian investors have time to build new sugarcane mills, U.S. 
investors have time to build more corn ethanol plants, if needed, and U.S. corn farmers 
have time to adjust their crop acres in response to a change to policy. A full, dynamic, 
optimal investment model is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, we make the 
following simplifying assumptions. For Brazilian ethanol production, in the policy 
scenarios that maintain the import tariff and for the no-policy scenario, we assume that 
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enough investment takes place so that Brazil’s domestic market-clearing price in 2014 
with no trade equals the 2011 market-clearing price with no trade. This requires 
production of 13.1 BG by 2014, which is an increase of 45% over 2011 production levels. 
This large growth results from the assumption that there will be 22.5 million FFVs in 
Brazil in 2014. For the remaining policy scenarios we assume that Brazil ramps up its 
ethanol production by an even greater amount and, in addition, invests in pipelines and 
port facilities that increase current limits on the country’s ability to export ethanol. Given 
constraints on how fast sugarcane fields and sugar mills can be brought up to full 
production capacity, 14.13 BG of ethanol could be produced in Brazil by 2014, and 
export capacity could grow from its current capacity of 1.32 BG to 3.5 BG per year by 
2014.20 In this report we do not account for the possibility that Brazilian imports could 
fill the 2014 mandate for advanced biofuels. If biodiesel meets its mandates in 2014, up 
to 500 MG of other advanced biofuels (such as sugarcane ethanol from Brazil) could still 
be required to meet 2014 mandates. 
Corn ethanol production capacity is assumed to increase to 15 BG in 2014 for all 
scenarios. This implies that all plants that are partially completed today will have to be 
completed and some new plants will have to be constructed or existing ones will have to 
expand capacity. The 2014 analysis assumes that EPA approves intermediate ethanol 
blends and that this approval increases the market value of ethanol in 2014. Under all the 
policy scenarios considered, average profitability of U.S. ethanol plants is positive, which 
shows that this assumption of expansion to 15 BG of capacity is consistent with the other 
model assumptions. One would expect that the larger is the profit margin for ethanol 
facilities, the greater will be the investment. But mandates for corn ethanol are capped at 
15 BG, and it may be possible that advanced biofuels will begin to enter the market by 
2014. So plant capacity is fixed at 15 BG for all policy scenarios.  
U.S. corn acreage in 2013 (which will be used to produce 2014 ethanol) should also 
adjust across policy scenarios because the price of corn will depend on ethanol policy. 
                                                 
20 To obtain these estimates, we worked with UNICA’s economist, Luciano Rodrigues, who has good 
knowledge of the Brazilian ethanol industry. In each scenario, 500 MG of Brazilian ethanol is exported to 
non-U.S. destinations. This reduces the maximum volume of Brazilian exports destined for the United 
States to 3.0 BG in 2014.  
22 / Babcock, Barr, and Carriquiry   
 
With a trend yield of 163.8 bu/ac in 2013, 85.95 million acres of harvested corn are 
needed to keep average corn prices constant at 2011 levels under current policies. We 
hold U.S. corn acreage constant at this level across all scenarios. An alternative method 
of choosing acreage would be to find the corn acreage under each scenario that held U.S. 
corn prices constant. But we held corn acreage fixed across the scenarios to maximize the 
estimated impacts of a policy change on U.S. corn prices. If we had adjusted corn acreage 
in response to policies that reduce the demand for U.S. corn, then the estimated price 
impacts would be smaller. The 2014 results are shown in Table 2. 
Maintenance of Current Policies. Average U.S. ethanol production under 
maintenance of current policies is 14.9 BG. This exceeds the 14.4 BG mandate for 2014 
in most combinations of corn yields and gasoline prices because the average ethanol price 
increases substantially above 2011 levels to $2.19 per gallon. The reason for this 
increased ethanol price is the assumption that EPA allows intermediate blends in a way 
that substantially increases U.S. ethanol demand.21 The corn and ethanol prices under 
maintenance of current policy create favorable processing margins for ethanol plants. The 
average processing margin for U.S. ethanol plants is $1.19 per bushel. One would expect 
that these favorable margins would result in additional production capacity. Only 15% of  
 
TABLE 2. Average results for ethanol policy scenarios in 2014 






















Mandate, Tax Credit, Tariff 3.79 2.19 1.84 0.03 14.90 270 
Mandate, Tax Credit 3.74 2.10 1.94 0.02 14.77 1,533 
Mandate, Tariff 3.71 1.90 1.78 0.17 14.68 73 
Mandate Only 3.63 1.85 1.71 0.15 14.43 737 
Mandate, Tax Credit = Tariff 3.79 2.18 1.85 0.03 14.90 297 
No Programs 3.29 1.77 1.83 0.0 13.46 229 
aAverage U.S. wholesale price, including any RIN price. 
bWholesale domestic Brazilian ethanol price for anhydrous ethanol. The exchange rate is set at 1.75 reals per dollar. 
 
                                                 
21 Even with the increased demand, the average market value of ethanol in 2014, after subtracting the 
blenders credit, is 75% that of gasoline, which still creates favorable margins for blenders. 
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the yield–gasoline price combinations result in a binding mandate. Fully 81% of the 
combinations result in U.S. domestic production at 15 BG. This shows that there is 
excess demand for ethanol with the approval of intermediate blends and the maintenance 
of current policy. 
However, this excess demand for ethanol capacity does not result in a large surge of 
ethanol imports because the import tariff is maintained, the additional investment in 
Brazilian ethanol production and export capacity does not occur, and because Brazilian 
domestic ethanol demand is so strong. An average of 270 MG is imported from Brazil. In 
81% of the yield–gasoline price draws, imports from Brazil are zero.  
Elimination of the Tariff. The main impact of eliminating the import tariff is an 
increase in Brazilian exports to 1.53 BG. This increased supply reduces U.S. ethanol 
production by an average of 130 MG. Average U.S. production does not decrease by 
more than this amount because profit margins from ethanol production remain strong. 
U.S. ethanol prices decrease by an average of 9 CPG whereas Brazilian ethanol prices 
increase by 10 U.S. CPG. The remaining price gap between Brazilian and U.S. ethanol 
prices reflects transportation costs. The price of corn falls by 5 cents per bushel because 
of slightly lower ethanol demand. U.S. ethanol processing margins are still a high 97 
cents per bushel. 
The relatively small impact of tariff elimination is due primarily to the assumption 
of strong growth in Brazil’s domestic ethanol demand combined with strong demand 
for U.S. ethanol. The Brazilian demand growth limits Brazil’s incentive to export 
ethanol. If Brazilian domestic demand growth is slower and Brazil’s production 
capacity growth is held constant at assumed levels, then Brazilian exports would be 
higher than reported in Table 2, and U.S. ethanol production and corn prices would 
decrease by a greater amount.  
Elimination of the Blenders Tax Credit. The main impact of tax credit elimination is a 
drop in the price of ethanol. The U.S. price decreases by 19 CPG. Corn prices drop by 
less than one would expect if ethanol plants were operating with tight margins. But 
because ethanol production capacity is limited to 15 BG in 2014, in most of the yield–
gasoline price combinations (60%), processing margins remain positive so corn prices do 
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not have to adjust downward by a large amount to allow ethanol plants to operate at 
break-even levels. The market for RINs plays a much more important job, inducing 
blenders to blend mandated volumes. The average price of RINs increases by 14 CPG 
relative to the average price under current policy. This means that the burden of meeting 
the mandates falls increasingly on blenders and fuel consumers rather than on taxpayers. 
Average processing margins for U.S. ethanol plants fall to 44 cents per bushel. 
Mandate Only. Elimination of both the tax credit and the tariff has larger market 
impacts than elimination of only the tax credit because of the assumption that Brazil 
invests in additional production and export capacity in response to tariff removal. 
Average imports from Brazil are 737 MG under this scenario. U.S. and Brazilian ethanol 
prices equalize (after transportation costs are accounted for) when trade occurs. But 
because there are corn yield–gasoline price combinations in which trade equals zero, the 
average ethanol price difference between Brazil and the United States does not equal 
transportation costs. The average RIN price under this scenario drops by 2 CPG 
compared to the average RIN price when the tariff is in place. This shows that removing 
the tariff makes it less costly to meet U.S. domestic mandates, especially when low corn 
yields make it costly for U.S. producers to maintain production levels. Average 
processing margins for U.S. ethanol plants equal 35 cents per bushel. 
Parity between Tariff and Tax Credit. Lowering the import tariff to parity with the 
existing tax credit has almost no market impact because it is assumed that this policy 
scenario does not induce investors to increase Brazilian ethanol production or export 
capacity. The small decrease in the import tariff does not significantly increase the 
incentive for Brazil to export additional ethanol relative to the current policy scenario. 
Average processing margins for U.S. ethanol plants are almost the same as under current 
policies at $1.18 per bushel. 
No Government Intervention. Complete removal of all ethanol programs would have 
the largest impact on ethanol and corn prices. Recall that corn acreage, hence average 
supply, is held constant across all six scenarios. This means that corn prices are directly 
related to domestic ethanol production. Removal of all programs results in a 1.44 BG 
decrease in ethanol production. Corn prices drop by 13% and ethanol prices drop by 
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almost 20%. Imports do not greatly increase because it is assumed that this policy 
scenario does not induce investors to increase Brazilian production or export capacity 
relative to what occurs under the scenario in which current policies are maintained. With 
no government intervention, one would expect that processing margins for ethanol plants 
would fall to break-even levels. But strong demand for ethanol in many of the corn yield–
gasoline price scenarios has ethanol production at capacity so that average margins do not 
fall to zero. Average processing margins are 40 cents per bushel. 
Summary of 2014 Impacts of Alternative Ethanol Policies. The impacts of a change 
in U.S. ethanol policy in 2014 are larger than 2011 impacts because Brazil has a chance 
to respond by ramping up its ability to export in response to trade liberalization. But 
because of strong domestic demand growth and limits on how fast Brazilian ethanol 
production can increase, the impacts of a change in policy are still modest. As long as 
the mandate is maintained, U.S. ethanol production drops by no more than 500 MG, 
corn prices drop by no more than 16 cents per bushel, and ethanol prices drop by no 
more than 35 CPG.  
The 2014 results are more uncertain than the 2011 results because of uncertainty 
about (1) how EPA will allow intermediate ethanol blends to enter the market; (2) the 
extent of Brazilian domestic ethanol demand growth; (3) the ability of Brazil to ramp up 
ethanol production to meet expanded domestic demand and possibly increased export 
demand; (4) whether investors will increase U.S. ethanol production capacity to 15 BG or 
beyond; and (5) how U.S. corn producers will respond to changes in U.S. ethanol policy. 
It is useful here to summarize the assumptions that were made so that the projected 
market impacts of changing U.S. ethanol policy can be put into context. 
First, we assume that EPA allows intermediate blends and that the agency 
implements this decision in a way that significantly increases the market value of 
ethanol. This assumption is perhaps the most important assumption made in this 
analysis because if EPA does not make this policy decision, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, for the United States to consume mandated ethanol volumes in 2014. 
Second, we assume continued strong growth in the number of  FFVs entering the 
Brazilian vehicle fleet. Third, we assume that Brazil can ramp up domestic ethanol 
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production by one billion gallons per year more than what is needed to keep Brazilian 
domestic ethanol prices with no exports constant at what the model projects prices to be 
under no trade in 2011. Fourth, we fix U.S. ethanol production capacity at 15 BG. Fifth, 
we fix U.S. corn acres harvested at 85.95 million acres in 2014 across all scenarios. 
And sixth, we fix industrial demand for ethanol in Brazil and exports from Brazil to 
countries other than the United States. 
Insight into the impacts of the EPA not allowing intermediate blends can be 
obtained from FAPRI.22 The impact of allowing intermediate blends in a way that 
significantly boosts ethanol demand shows up primarily in the profits of ethanol plants. 
To show the sensitivity of the Table 2 results to the growth in FFVs in Brazil, all 
scenarios for 2014 were re-run assuming a 50% reduction in the growth of Brazilian 
FFVs. All other assumptions are held constant, including the extent to which Brazilian 
ethanol production expands. Hence, the results represent what would happen if 
Brazilian ethanol capacity would gear up for anticipated domestic demand growth but 
the growth did not materialize.  
Results for 2014 with Half the Growth in Brazilian Flex-Fuel Vehicles 
The most apparent change that occurs if Brazil ramps up production for domestic 
demand that does not occur is that exports to the United States would be much larger than 
under the robust FFV growth that underlies the results reported in Table 2. An average of 
1.1 BG of ethanol would be exported to the United States if current policies are 
maintained. This would decrease the price of ethanol and corn by a small amount relative 
to Table 2 levels. Because there is such an oversupply of ethanol in Brazil in the Table 3 
results, trade occurs under almost all combinations of corn yields and gasoline prices. 
Thus, across all policy scenarios, imports from Brazil would increase dramatically and 
the average price of ethanol in Brazil would be approximately equal to the U.S. price less 
transportation and less any import tariff. 
                                                 
22 FAPRI-MU, “US Biofuel Baseline Briefing Book: Projections for Agricultural and Biofuel Markets,” 
Report #04-10, http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/outreach/publications/2010/FAPRI_MU_Report_04_10.pdf. 
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TABLE 3. Average results in 2014 when flex-fuel vehicle growth is cut in half  






















Mandate, Tax Credit, Tariff 3.75 2.14  1.44  0.02  14.77 1.10 
Mandate, Tax Credit 3.66 2.04   1.87  0.01  14.52 2.84 
Mandate, Tariff  3.60  1.85 1.24   0.14  14.34 0.77 
Mandate Only 3.33  1.73   1.57   0.08  13.57 2.43 
Mandate, Tax Credit = Tariff 3.74  2.13   1.53   0.02  14.75 1.23 
No Programs 3.21   1.73  1.56  - 13.21 1.29 
aAverage U.S. wholesale price including any RIN price. 
bWholesale domestic Brazilian ethanol price for anhydrous ethanol. The exchange rate is set at 1.75 reals per dollar. 
 
The Table 3 results are not realistic for some scenarios, however, because when the 
U.S. tariff remains in place, the domestic price of ethanol in Brazil is likely too low to 
support the level of Brazilian ethanol production assumed. For example, under the 
scenario in which the tax credit is eliminated but the tariff and mandate are kept in 
place, the Brazilian price of ethanol would drop to $1.24 per gallon. However, 
intermediate results between the strong domestic demand (Table 2) and the dampened 
demand (Table 3) can be envisioned. 
The Table 3 results show that the U.S. prices of corn and ethanol are not overly 
sensitive to the assumption that the Brazilian FFV fleet continues to show strong growth 
to 2014. The reason for this relative insensitivity is that by 2014, it is assumed that the 
EPA introduces intermediate blends in such a way that the market value of ethanol in the 
United States at a quantity of 15 BG equals 75% of the gasoline price. The resulting 
demand curve in this study drops this market value to 67% of the price of gasoline at 18 
BG. Thus the U.S. market in 2014 can absorb relatively large increases in ethanol 
volumes. If EPA introduces intermediate blends in a manner that does not support this 
level of ethanol prices, then the U.S. market will not be able to absorb this volume of 
ethanol, and both U.S. and Brazilian ethanol production levels will be lower than 
assumed here. 
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Distributional Impacts  
The price and quantity changes reported in Tables 1 and 2 provide some insight into 
the magnitude of the impacts of a change in ethanol policy. More insight can be obtained 
by calculating the aggregate impacts of a policy change on affected parties. The groups 
for which we calculate aggregate impacts include U.S. blenders, U.S. corn producers, 
U.S. ethanol producers, U.S. taxpayers, and Brazilian fuel users. How each of these 
aggregate impacts is calculated is discussed next. 
We use two methods to calculate the impact of a policy change on U.S. blenders. 
The first method is to simply calculate the change in the area under the U.S. demand 
curve for ethanol. What this change in area actually measures is not easy to determine. 
Part of the reason why the demand for ethanol slopes downward may be because it takes 
a lower price to induce the marginal consumer to buy ethanol as ethanol volumes rise. If 
consumer preference is the primary reason why the price of ethanol falls with increasing 
quantities, then the change in the area under the blenders’ ethanol demand curve is a good 
measure of the consumer impact of a change in ethanol policy. However, if blended fuel 
is viewed as a perfect substitute for unblended gasoline by consumers, then the ethanol 
demand curve slopes down because of costs associated with delivering ethanol for 
blending to regions of the market that are not using blended fuel. Such costs could 
include transportation costs and the cost of investing in blending infrastructure at gasoline 
terminals. In this case, the change in the area under the blenders’ demand curve is not a 
good representation of the impact of a change in policy on consumers because if blended 
fuel is a perfect substitute for unblended fuel, then their prices will be the same. A better 
measure of the aggregate impact would then be to treat ethanol as a perfect substitute for 
gasoline and to simply calculate the blending margin, which equals the difference 
between the price of gasoline and the price of ethanol multiplied by the quantity of 
ethanol. The blending margin, however, does not account for the cost of investing and 
maintaining required blending infrastructure.  
For both measures, the treatment of the tax credit needs to be carefully accounted 
for. Because the tax credit increases the willingness to pay for ethanol, the price of 
ethanol that ethanol plants and ethanol importers receive includes the impact of the tax 
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credit. However, the net price that blenders pay for ethanol is the market price less the tax 
credit. Because the tax credit shifts up the ethanol demand curve, the change in the area 
under the demand curve includes the value of the tax credit. Thus, the area under the 
demand curve measure assumes that the tax credit confers a consumer benefit. Because 
the tax credit accrues to blenders, it will increase blending margins. Thus, the second 
measure of impact on blenders assumes that the blenders tax credit accrues to blenders 
and not consumers. The “true” blender/consumer impact of a change in policy likely falls 
somewhere between these two measures. 
Because we do not have an upward-sloping corn supply curve and costs are fixed, the 
only measure we have of the aggregate impact on corn producers is the change in market 
revenue. No accounting is made for government program payments that could be triggered 
by low corn prices. 
U.S. taxpayers pay for the blenders tax credit and receive income from the import 
tariff. Therefore, the aggregate impact on taxpayers is accounted for by changes in the 
aggregate cost of the tax credit and the revenue from the import tariff. 
Table 4 presents the changes in aggregate impact measures. For 2011, when the tariff 
is removed, the aggregate impacts are modest. Consumers/blenders gain a small amount. 
U.S. corn and ethanol producers lose a modest amount. And Brazilian fuel consumers pay 
a bit more for their ethanol. The effects of removing the tax credit are much larger. If 
blenders receive all the benefit of the tax credit, then they lose about $5 billion from its 
elimination. If consumers gain all the benefit of the tax credit, then their loss is $2 billion. 
This loss is lower than the change in the blending margin because consumers gain from 
lower ethanol prices. U.S. ethanol producers lose about $760 million because of lower 
ethanol processing margins. Corn grower revenue declines by a modest amount. And 
taxpayers gain about $6 billion. What these results show is that elimination of the 
blenders tax credit moves the cost of meeting ethanol mandates from taxpayers to fuel 
consumers and blenders. This is arguably a reasonable redistribution if fuel users are the 
source of the problems that are meant to be solved by increased ethanol production. 
Elimination of the tariff in addition to the blenders tax credit has little additional impact 
because the incentive to export ethanol from Brazil in 2011 is so low. Equalizing the  
30 / Babcock, Barr, and Carriquiry   
 
TABLE 4. Distributional impacts from a change in ethanol policy in 2011 and 2014 





 U.S.  




 U.S.  
 Taxpayer 
 Savingsf  
 Demand  
 Curvea  
 Blending 
 Marginb  
2011 Results $ billion 
No Tariff 0.14 0.17 -0.14 -0.09 -0.27 -0.02 
No VEETC -2.03 -5.05 -3.00 -0.76 0.04 6.09 
No Tariff or 
VEETC -1.98 -5.00 -3.13 -0.77 -0.09 6.09 
Set Tariff = 
VEETC 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
No Programs 0.22 -4.94 -10.7 -0.79 -0.01 6.09 
             
2014 Results            
No Tariff 1.33 0.74 -0.42 -1.10 -1.08 -0.54 
No VEETC -0.10 -2.64 -0.75 -4.02 0.66 6.80 
No Tariff or 
VEETC 0.71 -1.68 -1.58 -4.49 1.60 6.80 
Set Tariff = 
VEETC 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.14 0.00 
No Programs 1.82 -2.04 -4.89 -4.37 0.07 6.80 
aChange in average area under the U.S. ethanol demand curve. 
bChange in average blending margin where blending margin equals the price of gasoline minus the price of ethanol plus 
the tax credit if the tax credit exists. 
cChange in average value of production. 
dChange in the average product of the processing margin and U.S. ethanol production. 
eArea under the Brazil demand curve for ethanol. 
fChange in the average cost of the blenders’ cost of the tax credit less the change in tariff revenue. 
 
tariff with the tax credit has little impact because the now lower import tariff is still 
largely prohibitive. And finally, elimination of all programs benefits taxpayers but results 
in losses to ethanol producers, blenders through their blending margins, and U.S. ethanol 
producers. Not shown, but calculated, U.S. feed consumers (the U.S. livestock industry) 
gain an average of $4.35 billion in 2011 from elimination of ethanol programs. This gain 
was estimated as the area under the U.S. feed demand curve, which treats livestock 
production as largely constant. Over time, livestock production levels would increase 
with lower feed costs, which would lead to a small decrease in meat and dairy prices. 
The average 2014 impacts on ethanol producers from a change in policy are larger 
than the 2011 impacts because U.S. ethanol processing margins are so much larger in 2014 
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with approval of intermediate blends and the assumed U.S. production capacity of 15 BG. 
Elimination of the tariff in 2014 combined with the assumed associated increase in 
Brazilian ethanol production and export infrastructure results in a larger impact relative to 
the current policy than in 2011. Consumers/blenders benefit from removal of the tariff by 
$1.33 billion or $0.74 billion (depending on the method used) because of lower ethanol 
prices. U.S. ethanol producers lose an average of about $1.1 billion from removal of the 
tariff. Taxpayers lose about $540 million because they pay for the tax credit on additional 
imported ethanol and a bit of lost tariff revenue. Brazilian consumers lose about $1.1 
billion because of higher domestic ethanol prices due to expanded exports. Removal of the 
tax credit reduces blending margins by about $2.6 billion. The impact is not greater because 
ethanol prices also drop with removal of the tax credit, which helps margins. U.S. ethanol 
produces lose about $4 billion with elimination of the tax credit because of lower ethanol 
prices and sharply lower processing margins. Brazilian consumers gain a small amount 
because of lower domestic ethanol prices. Taxpayers gain almost $6.7 billion from 
elimination of the tax credit. Again, removal of the blenders tax credit would move the cost 
of meeting ethanol mandates away from taxpayers. Because U.S. ethanol production in 
2014 with the tax credit has a high probability of being at full capacity, a greater share of 
the taxpayer benefit of eliminating the blenders tax credit is borne by the U.S. ethanol 
industry. In essence, eliminating the tax credit lessens the incentive to invest in more corn 
ethanol facilities. Removal of the import tariff in addition to eliminating the tax credit 
would help consumers and blenders because of lower ethanol prices than if just the tax 
credit were removed. The lower ethanol prices and associated lower corn prices would drop 
corn revenue and U.S. ethanol profits by an additional $830 million and $470 million, 
respectively. Equating the tariff with the tax credit has almost no impact relative to the 
situation under current policies because the import tariff is still high. And finally, 
elimination of all programs would have the largest beneficial impact on consumers (if 
lower ethanol prices are passed on to them with lower fuel prices) and the largest negative 
impact on corn producers and U.S. ethanol producers. Not shown, the U.S. livestock 
industry would gain an average of approximately $2.7 billion in 2014 from elimination of 
all programs.  
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Much alarm about the impact on jobs from changing ethanol policy has been raised 
by supporters of current policies. Although consideration of market impacts beyond the 
three markets considered is beyond the scope of this analysis, the changes in U.S. ethanol 
production can give an indication of possible wider impacts. From Tables 1 and 2, 
elimination of the ethanol import tariff would decrease average U.S. production by 30 
MG in 2011 and by 120 MG in 2014. For each 100 MG ethanol plant there are perhaps 
60 direct jobs involved. Thus, the import tariff would lead to a direct loss of 20 jobs in 
2011 and 72 jobs in 2014. Using the same logic, the decrease in U.S. ethanol production 
caused by elimination of the VEETC would result in job losses of 407 in 2011 and 132 in 
2014. So, based on the impact on direct jobs associated with the ethanol industry, a 
change in ethanol policy would not have major implications for the U.S. employment 
picture. A more accurate and complete accounting for the impacts on employment from a 
change in ethanol policy would need to account for indirect employment changes in both 
crop and livestock production. Lower corn prices would likely lead to somewhat lower 
corn production and somewhat higher production of other crops, which could lead to 
some loss of jobs. But higher livestock production stimulated by lower feed costs would 
lead to a gain in jobs in the livestock, dairy, and meatpacking sectors. A full accounting 
for these changes is well beyond the scope of this study.  
 
Conclusions 
The U.S. ethanol industry is lobbying hard for an extension of existing ethanol 
import tariffs and blenders tax credits before they expire at the end of 2010. The purpose 
of this study is to examine the likely consequences on the U.S. ethanol industry, corn 
producers, taxpayers, fuel blenders, and fuel consumers if current policy is not extended. 
Impacts of different ethanol policies in both 2011 and 2014 were estimated. The largest 
policy impact in 2011 would come about from elimination of the blenders tax credit 
because blenders rather than taxpayers would be forced to bear the cost of meeting 
ethanol mandates. Elimination of the ethanol import tariff would have a small impact on 
the U.S. ethanol market because of strong Brazilian domestic growth in demand for 
ethanol due to a rapid expansion in Brazil’s fleet of flex-fuel vehicles and a limit on how 
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much ethanol Brazil can produce in 2011. If the demand growth continues as expected, 
then Brazil will not be in a position to export large volumes of ethanol to the U.S. market 
in 2014 unless a rapid expansion in Brazilian ethanol and sugarcane production capacity 
takes place. An important underlying assumption of this study is that Brazilian demand 
for ethanol does continue to grow rapidly, and if the U.S. signals that it wants to import 
Brazilian ethanol in 2014, that enough investment will take place that will allow Brazil to 
expand its production capacity by a greater amount than its demand growth. If adequate 
investment does not take place and if rapid Brazilian demand growth continues, then 
Brazil will not be in a position to export ethanol in 2014.  
A second important underlying assumption in this study is that the EPA will approve 
intermediate blends, such as E15 or E20, for sale in U.S. markets in a manner that allows 
15 BG of ethanol to be sold at a wholesale price equal to 75% of the price of gasoline. 
This is feasible if intermediate blends are allowed in most U.S. automobiles with few, if 
any, restrictions. Under this assumption, the demand for ethanol in the United States is 
strong enough to ensure profitable ethanol production and strong corn prices under all 
policy scenarios considered, with the possible exception of the “no program” scenario in 
which corn prices drop by 50 cents per bushel. This assumption is consistent with the 
need for EPA to reconcile its blending regulations with existing mandates. Without an 
expansion of blend rates, U.S. blenders likely will not be able to blend enough ethanol to 
meet ethanol mandates. An implication of our results is that if EPA does allow higher 
blends in the manner assumed, then there will exist a strong market incentive to produce 
or import more ethanol than current production capacity limits will allow. Under most of 
the policy alternative considered here, this will create strong operating margins and a 




Appendix: Model Details 
A partial equilibrium stochastic model was constructed to estimate the effects of 
alternative U.S. ethanol policies. It is assumed that any change from current U.S. ethanol 
policy takes effect on January 1, 2011. The model is partial equilibrium because only 
three markets are considered: the market for corn, Brazil’s market for ethanol, and the 
U.S. market for ethanol. Market-clearing corn and ethanol prices are found for 5,000 
pairs of independently drawn U.S. corn yields and gasoline prices. Average prices and 
quantities across the 5,000 draws are used to estimate the market and distributional 
impacts of the alternative policy scenarios.  
For 2011 impacts, 2010 U.S. corn acreage is fixed and the incentive for Brazil to 
export ethanol is determined by Brazil’s current production capacity, projected 2011 
domestic demand, and export infrastructure. To estimate 2014 impacts, U.S. corn acreage 
is increased and fixed across all policy scenarios. Brazilian ethanol production and export 
capacity depends on the U.S. policy under consideration. Next, we show details about the 
model’s specifications for 2011 and 2014 for each of the markets considered. 
 
U.S. Corn Market 
For 2011, corn supply equals beginning stocks (1.738 billion bushels) plus the product 
of yield and harvested acreage. Harvested acreage is fixed at 81.8 million acres, which is 
equal to that reported in the May 10, 2010, WASDE report. The 2010 U.S. corn yield per 
harvested acre follows a beta distribution with a mean of 163.5 bu/ac, a standard deviation 
of 10 bu/ac, a maximum yield of 181 bu/ac, and a minimum yield of 130 bu/ac. The mean 
yield was obtained from the May 10 WASDE report. The maximum, minimum, and 
standard deviation of yields were taken from historical yield levels adjusted to today’s 
mean yields. For 2014, harvested acres are fixed at 85.95 million acres; mean corn yield is 
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set at 163.8 bu/acre, which is the trend yield obtained from a 1990 to 2009 trend 
calculation.  Beginning stocks are fixed at 1.559 billion bushels. 
Non-ethanol corn demand curves are calibrated to the May 10 WASDE projections 
of corn demand for the 2010/11 marketing year. We treat the marketing year as being 
synonymous with the calendar year that begins in January after the marketing year 
commences. The impacts of distillers grains on feed demand are assumed accounted for 
in the WASDE projections. The resulting demand curves for 2011 are as follows.  
• Corn feed demand equals 6,688 – 382*Price of corn. Demand elasticity equals -0.25. 
• Corn food demand equals 1,480 – 37*Price of corn. Demand elasticity equals -0.096. 
• Corn storage demand equals 3000 –338* Price of corn. Demand elasticity equals -0.65. 
• Corn export demand equals 3,200 – 343*Price of corn. Demand elasticity equals -0.6. 
• Corn beginning stock equals 1.738 billion bushels. 
Non-ethanol corn demand curves for 2014 were calibrated to 2013/14 FAPRI market 
projections. The resulting demand curves (expressed in million bushels) are as follows.  
• Corn feed demand equals 6,721 – 373*Price of corn. Demand elasticity equals -0.25. 
• Corn food demand equals 1,449 – 35*Price of corn. Demand elasticity equals -0.096. 
• Corn storage demand equals 2,549 –279* Price of corn. Demand elasticity equals -0.65. 
• Corn export demand equals 3,482 – 363*Price of corn. Demand elasticity equals -0.6. 
• Corn beginning stock equals 1.559 billion bushels. 
 
The U.S. Ethanol Market 
The supply of U.S. ethanol equals the excess supply of corn after non-ethanol 
demands are subtracted from U.S. corn supplies. This excess corn supply curve is 
converted into a supply curve for ethanol by calculating the ethanol price that is needed 
to cover all ethanol production costs, after accounting for the revenue from distillers 
grains. The supply of U.S. ethanol in 2011 is capped at 14.5 BG. The cap is increased to 
15 BG in 2014.  
We assume that all U.S. corn ethanol plants produce 2.75 gallons of ethanol and 17 
pounds of dry distillers grains per bushel of corn processed. The price of distillers grains is 
set at 85% of the price of corn. The variable cost of producing ethanol equals the price of 
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corn plus 54 CPG. To account for different efficiency levels among ethanol plants, ethanol 
plants are assumed to need 20 CPG in operating margin to continue operating. Operating 
margins per bushel of corn above 20 CPG therefore are given by equation (A1): 
 Margin = 2.75*Pethanol  +  17/56 * 0.85*Pcorn - Pcorn - 2.75*0.54). (A1) 
The minimum price of ethanol that is required for any price of corn is therefore given by  
 Pethanol  = 0.269818*Pcorn + 0.612727. (A2) 
This is the supply price of ethanol. The quantity of ethanol equals 2.75 multiplied by 
the quantity of excess supply of corn for any corn price. The corresponding price is given 
by equation (A2). 
The demand for ethanol by blenders depends on the price of gasoline. To account for 
the need to induce ethanol blenders to use high volumes of ethanol, for 2011 the market 
value of ethanol is set equal to 50% of the wholesale price of gasoline at a volume of 15 
BG. To account for the demand of ethanol as an oxygenate at low volumes of ethanol, we 
make demand perfectly inelastic at 5 BG. At 5 BG, the market value for ethanol is set on 
a par with the wholesale price of gasoline. For volumes between 5 and 15 BG the market 
value is linear. In 2014, the market value of ethanol is increased to 75% of the price of 
gasoline at 15 BG to reflect the impacts of allowing intermediate blends. In both 2011 
and 2014, gasoline prices are log-normally distributed with a mean of $2.30 per gallon 
and a volatility of 29%. Both represent early May levels of the futures and options 
markets for reformulated gasoline.  
 
The Market for Brazilian Ethanol 
Ethanol Demand in Brazil 
Fuel ethanol in Brazil is consumed both as pure ethanol (in ethanol vehicles and FFVs) 
and blended with gasoline (in gasoline vehicles and FFVs). Anhydrous ethanol is used in 
the mandatory blends, and ethanol and FFVs use the hydrous form, which contains about 
5% water. All the gasoline sold in the country contains between 20% and 25% anhydrous 
ethanol. To reflect this, the domestic demand for fuel ethanol is modeled as  
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 ( )(1 )e e f e g g fE N L N L L N Nα γ α= + + + −  (A3) 
where E represents the volume of hydrous ethanol consumed in a year, N is the number 
of vehicles, L is the volume of fuel consumed by a vehicle per year, α is the portion of 
FFVs that utilize ethanol (average for the year), γ is the mandatory ethanol blend level. 
The subscripts indicate ethanol (e), flex-fuel (f), and gasoline (g) vehicles. While owners 
of gasoline and ethanol vehicles are constrained in the fuel they can use, owners of FFVs 
can choose between gasoline and ethanol based on their relative price. This choice is 
captured by the coefficient α  in equation (A3). When the price of ethanol is low relative 
to that of gasoline, a large proportion of FFV owners will fill their tanks with ethanol, and 
α will be large. Conversely, a high ethanol-to-gasoline price ratio will induce FFV 
owners to switch to gasoline, which is reflected through a lower value of α .   
Assuming that ethanol has about 67% of the energy content of gasoline, that the 
mandatory blend is 25% of anhydrous ethanol in volume, and that hydrous ethanol 
contains about 5% water, the amount of hydrous ethanol needed to displace a unit of 
gasoline C (blended) can be approximated as 1.388e gL L= .23 With this in place, equation 
(A3) simplifies to 
 
( )1
1.388 1.388e e f g
E L N N Nγ γα α⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ , (A4) 
which with the mandatory blend at 25% simplifies to  
 ( )( )( ).18 1 .18e e f gE L N N Nα α= + + − + . 
The number of vehicles assumed for equation (A4) are given in Table A1. 
TABLE A1. Vehicle fleet assumed in Brazil 
Year Gasolinea Ethanol Flex Fuel 
2011 17.8 1.0 12.5 
2014 16.3 0.4 22.5 
Source: UNICA. 
Note: UNICA reports that flex-fuel vehicle sales rose from 2.3 million in 2008 to 2.65 million in 2009 and as of March 
1, 2010, the country has 10 million flex-fuel vehicles. The numbers assume that if Brazilian GDP growth continues at 
between 4% and 5% per year, sales of flex-fuel vehicles should accelerate.  
aIncludes motorcycles measured on a car-equivalent basis (three motorcycles equal one car).  
                                                 
23 (0.25*1*1.05 0.75*1.5)e gL L= + . 
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The hydrous ethanol demand now depends on the size of the light vehicles fleet, the 
ethanol consumption per vehicle, and the average share of FFVs that filled with ethanol. 
This latter share determines to a large extent how sensitive the overall demand of ethanol 
is to the ethanol price, which determines the ethanol-to-gasoline C (blended gasoline)  
price ratio because the price of gasoline A (pure gasoline) is treated as fixed owing to 
regulations. The ethanol-to-gasoline price ratio also enters into the term for the total 
ethanol consumption per car ( eL ), which is modeled using a constant elasticity function 
(with the elasticity set at -0.04). The function is calibrated by fixing ethanol consumption 
per vehicle per year at 2,175 at a price ratio of 0.7.  
The proportion of FFV owners using ethanol (α ) is modeled using a beta 
distribution, with coefficients calibrated based on recent observations containing a strong 
increase in the price of ethanol relative to gasoline. For 2009, the average price ratio of 
ethanol to gasoline was 0.56. For that price ratio, the proportion of FFVs using ethanol 
( )α was determined by UNICA to be 0.7. During the ramp-up of ethanol prices in 
January and February, the ethanol-to-gasoline price ratio rose to 0.73 and the proportion 
of FFVs using ethanol declined to about 0.44. These observations provide the two points 
needed to calibrate a standard beta distribution. The resulting parameters are p = 2.6987 
and q = 1.3579. The resulting function is shown in Figure A1. 
Industrial uses are another source of domestic demand for ethanol. This demand was 
assumed to be fixed at 1.3 and 1.5 billion liters for 2011 and 2014, respectively. Exports 
to countries other than the United States are assumed constant at 1.8 billion liters across 
all scenarios in both years. 
Ethanol Supply in Brazil 
The domestic supply curve of Brazilian ethanol is made a function of the price of 
ethanol and is calibrated to estimates of supply provided to us by UNICA. The short-run 
supply elasticity is set at 0.04 to reflect the fact that Brazilian sugar mills have some 
flexibility to alter the mix of sugar and ethanol depending on relative prices. The 
calibration points for supply are as follows: 34.1 billion liters for 2011; 50 billion liters 
for 2014 when there is no incentive to increase production for the U.S. market; and 53.5  




FIGURE A1. The proportion of Brazilian flex-fuel vehicles using ethanol 
 
billion liters in 2014 when there is an incentive to produce for the U.S. export market. All 
these production levels occur with an ethanol-to-gasoline-price ratio of 0.7. The 50-
billion-liter calibration point was selected to make the Brazilian domestic ethanol price 
with export to the U.S. equal to the Brazilian domestic ethanol price in 2011 with no 
exports to the United States. This production level is much higher than assumed by other 
sources, including the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture (45.5 billion liters) and FAPRI 
(37.14 billion liters). However, in a presentation at the 78th annual meeting of the 
International Fertilizer Association in Paris, France, on May 31, 2010, Andre Pessoa 
projected 50 billion liters of Brazilian ethanol production in 2014.  
 
 
